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Connell "Hot Cargo" Agreements:
The Supreme Court As Interpreted
By The NLRB
Peter G. Nash*

I.

Introduction

On June 2, 1975, the United States Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Connell Construction Co. v. Plumbers and
Steamfitters Local 100.1 That decision found what was previously
considered to be a "legal" restrictive subcontracting agreement between a construction employer and a union to be violative of section
8(e) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 2 and subject to

antitrust scrutiny.
* A.B. 1959, magna cum laude, Colgate University; LL.B. 1962, cuam laude, New York
University; Partner, Vedder, Price, Kaufman, Kammholz & Day, Washingtron, D.C.; formerly
General Counsel of the NLRB, 1971-1975, and Solicitor of the U.S. Department of Labor,
1970-1971.
1. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
2. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), provides as
follows:
Enforceability of contract or agreement to boycott any other employer; exception
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such employer
ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease
doing business with any other person, and any contract or agreement entered into
heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent unenforcible and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement
between a labor organization and an employer in the construction industry relating
to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be done at the site of the construction,
alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Providedfurther, That for the purpose of this subsection and subsection (b) (4) (B) of this section
the terms "any employer", "any person engaged in commerce or an industry affecting
commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in the
relation of a jobber, manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of
production in the apparel and clothing industry: Providedfurher,That nothing in
this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the
foregoing exception.

On November 13, 1978, the NLRB issued a series of decisions3
that analyze section 8(e) in light of Connell. This article interprets
what the Court said in Connell and what the NLRB says the Court

said in Connell, and considers whether one may comfortably rely
upon the NLRB's analysis, given the treble damage remedies available to plaintiffs who win antitrust cases.'
The Supreme Court's Connell decision and the Board's recent
interpretation of that decision are perhaps best understood against a

general background of the law regarding secondary boycotts and hot
cargo agreements.
II.

Secondary Boycotts and Hot Cargo Agreements

A.

The Ground Rules

Generally speaking, section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor
Relations Act,5 which prohibits secondary boycotts, provides that a
union having a dispute with employer A may not strike or picket
employer B to force the latter to cease doing business with A. Thus,
for example, if the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(IBEW) has a dispute with an electrical subcontractor on a construction site, it may picket only at a separate gate set aside for the electrical subcontractor's employees and may not picket other gates in an
effort to pressure the general construction contractor to remove the
electrical subcontractor from the job. Picketing of the general contractor is a prohibited secondary boycott because the general contractor and the electrical subcontractor are different employers and
because the removal of the subcontractor from the job would obvi3. Operating Eng'rs Local 701, 9 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978); Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council., 99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978); Colorado Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 99
L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978); Carpenters Locals 944 & 235, 99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1976).
4. The Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976). 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976) provides
for threefold damages on behalf of anyone injured by an antitrust violation. See UMW v.
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976) provides,
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents
(4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any
person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage in, a
strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where in either case an
object thereof is
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing or requiring any
other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title:
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing. ...

ously constitute a cessation of the business arrangement between the
general and the sub. This type of picketing is called a "secondary
boycott" for two reasons: first, the union's primary dispute is with
the sub, whereas the dispute with the general contractor is only secondary to that dispute, and second, the reason for the picketing is to
force the secondary general contractor to stop doing business withto boycott-the primary disputant, the subcontractor. Furthermore,
if the IBEW were to picket the construction job even before the electrical sub was hired in an effort to pressure the general contractor to
refrain from hiring the sub at all, then that picketing would likewise
constitute an unlawful secondary boycott. In other words, picketing
to stop the general from even commencing a business arrangement
to terminate a business
with a sub is just as unlawful as picketing
6
begun.
already
has
that
arrangement
Section 8(e) of the Act also prohibits "hot cargo" agreements,
which are nothing more than agreements to engage in a secondary
boycott.7 Thus, in the example above, if, instead of picketing, the
IBEW and the general contractor agreed that the electrical sub
would be removed from the job, that agreement would be covered by
section 8(e) of the NLRA. The agreement to treat the electrical sub's
work product as an unwanted commodity-a "hot cargo"-merely
takes the place of the picketing that, in the earlier example, is a secondary boycott. And just as picketing to keep a sub from ever being
hired in the first place is an unlawful secondary boycott, so is an
agreement to that effect between the general contractor and the
union an unlawful hot cargo agreement. Finally, any strike or picketing to pressure a contractor into entering an unlawful hot cargo
agreement violates section 8(b)(4)(A). s
B.

The Work Preservationor Union StandardsException

Unfortunately for construction unions and contractors, but fortunately for labor lawyers, exceptions to these general rules exist.
One important exception, which is not technically an exception, involves boycotts and hot cargo agreements that the NLRB and courts
have found to be primary and not secondary. These so-called primary pickets or agreements are generally characterized as "work
preservation" or "union standards" and are directed at a company
that employs union-represented workers. Their purpose is to remove
the company's financial incentive to take work away from the union6. See generally NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951).
See also the cases cited in note 3 supra.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
8. It is an unfair labor practice for a union to strike or picket for the purpose of "forcing
or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization
or to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by [section 8 (e)]." Id. at § 158(b)(4)(A).

represented employees and subcontract it to another company that
pays less or that provides cheaper or fewer benefits to its employees.
For example, if the general contractor in the example above normally employed electricians under a contract with the IBEW that set
certain wages and fringe benefits, the union could insist upon, and
strike to obtain, an agreement with the general stating that the general may not subcontract any work historically performed by his
IBEW- represented electricians unless the new subcontractor pays
his employees an amount of wages and fringes equivalent to that
called for in the IBEW contract. Thus, the following primary clause
is not covered at all by section 8(e), is lawful, and remains so even
after the Connell decision:
The Employer agrees to recognize the territorial and occupational
jurisdiction of the Union to the extent that it shall not use for the
performance of any work within that jurisdiction, which has been
istorically and continuously performed by employees within the
unit covered by this Agreement, any employer, company or concern that does not observe the equivalent of wages, fringe benefits,
hours and economic conditions of employment as enjoyed by the
employees covered by this Agreement.
The theory underlying the primary and lawful nature of these
work preservation agreements is that the union-represented employees have a right to protect their jobs and bargained wages against the
competition of cheaper labor, even though that right, exercised
against their primary employer by strikes or agreements, results in a
cessation or failure of their employer to do business with another
company which pays less. This theory presumably works if the only
subcontractors available to their employer pay the same amount of
wages and fringes. Consistent with that theory, however, is the requirement that any agreement so restricting subcontracting must
meet certain standards, two of which are particularly relevant to an
analysis of Connell's requirements.
First, the agreement must seek to protect only "unit work" as
opposed to work of union members generally. Thus, an agreement
between the IBEW and a general contractor that the latter will not
subcontract carpentry work to one who does not pay the same wages
and fringes as called for in the IBEW contract or the area's carpenter
union contract would be a unlawful secondary hot cargo agreement,
for the IBEW unit of represented employees does not ever perform
carpentry work. Such an agreement seeks to protect union interests
generally - not IBEW unit work.
Second, a restrictive subcontracting agreement is an unlawful
secondary hot cargo agreement, even though it only restricts the general contractor in the subcontracting of unit work of IBEW members, if the general may subcontract only to a company that has an
agreement with the IBEW or another union. This is unlawful be-

cause another agreement with the IBEW or any other union may not
call for-the payment of equivalent wages and fringes, and even if it
does, it will contain non-economic items, such as arbitration and
union security provisions, that ordinarly have nothing to do with removing the financial incentive to subcontract unit work, such as
equalizing pay and benefits. This latter type of agreement, commonly referred to as a "union signatory" agreement, assists union
interests generally by seeking to provide work for other union-represented employees, rather than seeking to preserve work for the primary IBEW unit employees. Accordingly, a union signatory
agreement is a second hot cargo agreement that violates Section 8(e)
of the Act unless 9it meets yet another exception to the general rules
discussed earlier.
The first proviso of section 8(e) legalizes an otherwise unlawful
secondary hot cargo agreement if "the agreement is between a union
and an employer in the construction industry, and the agreement
only restricts subcontracting of work to be performed at the site of
construction.""° Thus, at least prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Connell, a construction contractor and any union lawfully could
enter into a union signatory agreement providing that the contractor
would not subcontract any construction site work to another company unless that company had an agreement with another union.
Moreover, many assumed that these agreements could be lawfully
negotiated without regard to whether (1) the union represented any
of the general contractor's employees, (that is, whether or not a collective bargaining relationship existed between the general contractor and the union)," (2) the agreement related to any particular job
site,' 2 (3) the agreement restricted subcontracting of the general contractor's work only in the craft in which employees represented by
the union seeking the agreement were employed,' 3 and (4) the agreement required that the work could be subcontracted only to any em9. A Duie Pyle, Inc. v. NLRB, 383 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1967); Meat & Highway Drivers
Local 7 10 v. NLRB, 335 F.2d 709 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Orange Belt Dist. Council of Painters No.
48 v. NLRB, 328 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Heavy, Highway, Bldg., & Constr. Teamsters, et
al., 227 N.L.R.B. 169 (1976); Carpenters Dist. Council, 220 N.L.R.B. 1241 (1975); International Union of Operator Eng'rs Local 12, 212 N.L.R.B. 343 (1974); UMW, 188 N.L.R.B. 753,
755 (1971) (Miller, Chairman, and Brown, Member, dissenting); International Bhd. of Electrical Workers, Local 437, 180 N.L.R.B. 420, 421 (1969). See also the cases cited at note 3 supra,
and the NLRB General Counsel's Memorandum on Connell, 1976 LAB. REL. YEARBOOK 295,
308 n.27 (BNA) [hereinafter cited as the Connell Memorandum].
10. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976).
II. See, e.g., Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trade's Council, 214 N.L.R.B. 562 (1974);
Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Construction Co.), NLRB Case No. 16-CC-447 (May I, 1974) and
a published memorandum of the NLRB General Counsel (May 1, 1974).
12. See, e.g., cases cited in note Ii, supra. See also Northeastern Indiana Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 148 N.L.R.B. 854 (1964), enforcement deniedon other grounds, 352 F.2d 696
(D.C. Cir. 1965).
13. See, e.g., id.

ployer who had an agreement with a specific union or unions.' 4
Because such an agreement was lawful under the 8(e) proviso, a
5
union could strike to obtain it without violating section 8(b)(1)(A),'
since that section only outlaws strikes to obtain agreements prohibited by 8(e). 6 Nevertheless, such an agreement could not and cannot be enforced by strike or picket action of the union because that
activity would constitute a secondary boycott in violation of section
8b)(4)(B)I 7I - a section that has no proviso similar to that in 8(e). Is
The following clause is an example of the kind of agreement
many assumed was lawful, even though it was negotiated between a
company and union having no bargaining relationship with each
other:
THEREFORE, the contractor and the union mutually agree with
respect to work falling within the scope of this agreement that is to
be done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting or repair of any building, structure, or other works, that if the contractor should contract or subcontract any of the aforesaid work
falling within the normal trade jurisdiction of the union, said contractor shall contract or subcontract such work only to firms that
are parties to be executed, current, collective bargaining agreement with Local Union 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry.
The Supreme Court's decision in Connell seemed to at least
question most of these prior assumptions, and, indeed, found the last
quoted clause to be unlawful.' 9
III.

The Connell Decision

In Connell, Local 100 of the Plumbers and Steamfitters sought
to organize mechanical contractors in the Dallas area by picketing
certain general contractors, including Connell, to obtain an agreement that the contractors would subcontract job site work within the
jurisdiction of the union only to subcontractors who were parties to
an agreement with Local 100. Local 100 had no bargaining relationship with Connell and did not seek to represent any of Connell's
employees. Connell signed the agreement under protest and then
sued the union under the Sherman Act to have the agreement declared invalid as violative of the antitrust laws.
The Court dealt with the question whether the proviso to section 8(e) of the Act privileged the agreement.20 At the time of the
decision, it appeared that the Court answered the question by finding
14. See, e.g., id.
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1976).
16. See notes 2 and 8 supra.
17. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1976).
18. Compare id. § 158(b)(4)(B) with id. § 158(e).
19. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
20. Id. at 626-35.

that the agreement violated section 8(e) because three ingredients, all
of which were necessary for an agreement to be lawful under the
section 8(e) proviso, were missing: (1) the agreement was not made
in the context of a collective bargaining relationship between the
union (Local 100) and the employer (Connell); (2) the restriction of
the agreement on subcontracting was not limited to a particular job
site; 2' and (3) the agreement did not meet the basic purpose of the
8(e) proviso, which is to protect union employees from working
alongside nonunion employees.22
Thus, the Court apparently read into the section 8(e) construction proviso requirements that had not previously been considered
necessary. At the time of the Court's decision, and long before the
recent Board cases, some attorneys who sought to insure against Labor Act and antitrust liability for their clients interpreted the Court
to require a bargaining relationship and an agreement limited to a
particular job, with the purpose to protect union members from
working alongside nonunion employees.
A.

The BargainingRelationship.

Probably the clearest portion of the Connell decision indicated
that a union would not be free to seek even a valid section 8(e)
agreement unless it had a collective bargaining relationship with the
contractor from whom it sought such an agreement. The Court commenced its discussion with the assumption that agreements such as
the one sought by Local 100, which restricted subcontracting to only
union firms, are powerful organizing tools because any subcontractor who desires work from a general contractor who had agreed to
such a restriction would have to sign a union contract. The Court
then characterized such agreements as tools for "top down" organizing that are used in an effort to force union recognition by construction subcontractors, 23 a practice that Congress intended to limit by
enacting section 8(b)(7) and by its careful drafting of section 8(f) of
the Act. 24 Section 8(b)(7) limited the use of recognitional picketing,
and made provision for elections to determine if employees wanted
21. As discussed at note 44 and accompanying text Jnfra, this requirement seemed to
function in two ways: (1) the agreement must refer to a specific job; and (2) the agreement
may require that any subcontractor be signatory to a union contract only on that specific job
site.
22. As discussed at notes 45-50 and accompanying text infra, this requirement breaks
down into three subrequirements. (I) The restriction may be applied only on jobs on which
the union's members are or will be working. (2) The restrictive agreement can only prohibit
subcontracting of on-site construction work to non-union employees and cannot specify any
particular union or unions with whom an awardable subcontractor must have an agreement.
(3) The subcontractor need only employ union labor at times when the general contractor will
be using union labor on the site. See the Connell Memorandum, supra note 9, at 297-98.
23. 421 U.S. at 625.
24. Id. at 632-33.

union representation.25 Section 8(f) permits "pre-hire" agreements
in the construction industry, but only under safeguards maintaining
the employee's right to refuse union representation.2 6 Moreover, the
legislative history of section 8(f) suggests that Congress did not intend to allow strikes or picketing for the purpose of extracting
prehire agreements from unwilling employers.2 7
Therefore, the Court determined that Congress could not have
intended section 8(e) proviso agreements to be used on a wholesale
basis by unions for such organizing purposes because that would
undo for the construction industry the carefully developed policy reflected by sections 8(b)(7) and 8(f). 28 It was equally clear to the
Court, however, that Congress did intend that unions and construction employers be privileged to enter into some of these agreements
despite their organizational impact. But in order to limit the impact
of the agreements, and thus protect, to the extent possible, the congressional purpose to restrict "top down" organizing, the Court believed it necessary to limit the circumstances under which this
organizing tool could be used to effectuate the overall intent of Congress.29
Given the strong federal policy in favor of collective bargaining
agreements and relationships, the restrictive agreements clearly were
intended to be privileged when they arose from a collective bargaining relationship. Congress, however, did not indicate a desire to
privilege section 8(e) proviso agreements when the union and the
employer were "strangers." In fact, the only legislative history surrounding the construction proviso to section 8(e) deemed relevant by
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(1976).
26. It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction industry
to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their employment,
will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organzation
of which building and construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of this section as an unfair
labor practice) because (I) the majority status of such labor organization has not been
established under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such
agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of such
employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such
agreement requires the employer to notify such labor organization of opportunities
for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization an opportunity
to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies
minimum training or experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length of service with such employer,
in the industry or in the particular geographical area: Provided,That nothing in this
subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Providedfurther, That any agreement which would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this
subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c) or 159(e) of
this title.
Id. at § 158(0.
27. See 421 U.S. at 632-33.
28. Id. at 633.
29. Id.

the majority indicated that Congress intended to allow these agreements to be made only in the context of a bargaining relationship.3 0
To allow these agreements between strangers would create a loophole in the Act's restrictions against "top down" organizing that
would be counter to the intent of Congress.3 ' Accordingly, the Court
held that restrictive subcontracting agreements in the construction
industry were not privileged by the 8(e) proviso unless they were
entered into in the context of a collective bargaining relationship.3 2
In addition, and consistent with its analysis of the congressional
intent strictly to limit the use of such restrictive subcontracting and
the attendant organizational and recognitional impact, the Court appeared to impose two more requirements for 8(e) proviso legality
that seemed to be separate and distinct from the "bargaining relationship" requirement.
B.

The Agreement Must Be Limited To A ParticularJob Site.

The Court, evidencing again Congress' established concern that
restrictive subcontracting agreements not be given such a broad ef30. Id.
31. Although not discussed by the Court, to allow section 8(e) proviso agreements
outside a collective bargaining relationship would present a significant practical problem.
How would or could such agreements be terminated? Because the agreement would not depend upon the union's representation of any employees, or be subject to the usual termination
provisions of collective bargaining agreements, it could go on forever, thus further expanding
the impact of the union's "top down" organizing weapon.
32. Apparently, the requirement could also be met in the construction industry by a
union's request for a Section 8(0 sanctioned agreement.
It seems clear from the Court's discussion of section 8(f), particularly in note 10, that a
section 8(f) agreement involving a contractor who intended to use employees in the craft represented by the union would meet the Court's requirement of a "bargaining relationship." 421
U.S. at 631-32 n. 10. See the Connell Memorandum, supra note 9, at 297, 304. It also seems
clear from the discussion in note 10, however, that such an agreement would not be privileged
if it involved an employer who did not intend to hire any of its own employees to do the work
within the union's jurisdiction. Thus, the Court speculated that the agreement in the case it
was discussing, Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 214 N.L.R.B. 562 (1974), might
have been a section 8(f) agreement, but went on to indicate that, in addition, the agreement
might have been approved by the Board because no one argued before the Board the lack of a
collective bargaining relationship that would invalidate the agreement. 421 U.S. at 631-32
n.10.
It is doubtful, however, that any industrial employer who acts as its own general contractor may enter into a valid section 8(e) proviso agreement except in the unlikely event that the
employer has a preexisting bargaining relationship covering present construction employees.
If such an employer had no bargaining relationship with a construction union seeking such an
agreement, any agreement would be violative of section 8(e). Furthermore, section 8(f) would
be of no assistance, because even though the employer might be "in the construction industry"
as that phrase is used in the section 8(e) proviso, it clearly would not be "an employer engaged
primarily in the building and construction industry" as required by section 8(f). See Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 183 N.L.R.B. 1032 (1970). Thus, even if the industrial
employer contemplated using employees in the union's jurisdiction, it could not enter into a
valid section 8(f) relationship, and absent a preexisting bargaining relationship, any section
8(e) proviso agreement would violate section 8(e), and presumably, the antitrust laws. Butlc/
the Connell Memorandum, supra note 9, at 311 (suggesting that an employer engaged in the
construction industry, but with no construction employees, can create a section 8() relationship if the employer did intend to have some craft employees).

fect that they create too large a loophole in Congress' limitation of
"top down" organizing tools and tactics, seemed to hold that the 8(e)
proviso was not intended to protect agreements unless they were
confined to a particular jobsite. To determine if the Court really
meant to impose this requirement, it is useful to review certain parts
of the opinion.33
In discussing the 8(e) proviso the Court stated that Congress
was focusing on a single situation; namely, "allowing subcontracting
agreements only in relation to work done on a jobsite. ' ' 34 Therefore,

the Court reasoned, Congress could not have intended the use of
such agreements as a "broad organizational weapon." 35 Rather,
Congress, which was dealing only with the problem raised by the
Denver Building Trades case,36 must have intended merely to limit
lawful agreements to aparticularjobsite.37 Otherwise, unions would
be free to "enlist any general contractor to bring economic pressure
it
on nonunion subcontractors, as long as the agreement recited that 38
only covered work to be performed on some jobsite somewhere.
In light of Congress' express desire to limit organizational and recognitional economic weapons, Congress could not have intended this
result.39 Accordingly, and because it was dealing with the Denver
Building Trades problem, Congress "possibly" intended to privilege
restrictive subcontracting agreements "to common-situs relationships
on particular jobsites ...

."0

Thus, reasoning that since this is

what Congress "possibly" intended, and since this intent is consistent
with the overall statutory scheme, including its limitations on the use
of economic force for organizational and recognition purposes, the
Court appeared to hold that these agreements must be limited to relationships on a particular jobsite.4
To the question of how the lawful agreements should be limited,
the Court gave two clues. First, it referred to Congress' intent to deal
with the Denver Building Trades "problem," and second, out of concern for broad organizational impact, it limited 8(e) endorsement of
subcontracting agreements to "common-situs relationshipson partic33. Because the Court used the word "possibly" in describing Congress' intent to impose
the requirement that a subcontracting agreement be limited to a particular jobsite, there may
be some doubt that the Court really intended to make this a separate and particular requirement of § 8(e) legality. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S.
616, 633 (1975). The Court, however, dropped that word in its final decisional paragraph,
indicating an intention to require such a limited scope for § 8(e) agreements. Id. at 635.
34. Id. at 630 (emphasis added).
35. Id.
36. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675 (1951). See note 43
and accompanying text infra.
37. 421 U.S. at 632-33, 635.
38. Id. at 632.
39. Id. at 633.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 635.

"..
42
ular jobsites .
The Denver Building Trades decision of the Supreme Court concerned the picketing of a general contractor by a union to require the
general contractor to dismiss from its construction job a subcontractor with whom the union had a dispute. The union picketed the general contractor only at the construction site where the disputed
subcontractor was working. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissent,
The union was not pursuing the contractor to other jobs. All the
union asked was that union men not be compelled to work alongside nonunion men on the same job. As Judge Rifkind stated in
an analogous case, "the union was not extending its activity to a
front remote from the immediate dispute but to one intimately
and indeed inextricably united to it."
Accordingly, it seems that the Connell Court required that any
restrictive subcontracting agreement must relate to and cover only
one individual jobsite. Although it may be argued, given the Court's
discussion of the intent of the section 8(e) proviso to protect union
workers, that a general agreement between a union and a general
contractor restricting subcontracting only to union firms on any job
on which the agreeing union's members are employed by the general
contractor would be valid under 8(e), such an agreement would extend beyond the Denver problem specifically referred to by the Court
and would greatly expand the union's economic organizational
weapon beyond that apparently deemed proper by the Connell
Court. Therefore, the Court's rationale arguably privileges only
those agreements negotiated in relation to a specific individual jobsite.
Moreover, the Court's overriding concern with not extending a
union's use of a restricting subcontracting clause too far, and its pinpointing of Congress' intent in enacting the 8(e) proviso to the Denver problem, which dealt with a union's efforts to remove the
subcontractor from a specific jobsite, seem to indicate that the Court
intended not only that restrictive agreements be limited to a single
specific construction project, but further, that a union and general
contractor could not, by agreement or otherwise, compel a subcontractor to become a signatory to a union contract in regard to any
work of that subcontractor other than on the specific jobsite covered
by the subcontracting agreement. Thus, the subcontractor's "relationship" as a union contract signatory would be limited to the particular jobsite. 4 For example, if an otherwise nonunion contractor
performing work on seven other job sites obtained a subcontract to
42. Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
43. 341 U.S. 675, 692 (1951) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Douds v. Metropolitan
Fed'n, 75 F. Supp. 672, 677 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)) (footnote omitted).
44. Cf.Pickens-Bond Constr. Co. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 690, 99 L.R.R.M.
3321, 3325 (8th Cir. 1978) (union and contractor attempted to negotiate a settlement regarding

perform work on a site lawfully covered by a restrictive subcontracting agreement between the general contractor and a union, the subcontractor could be required to sign a union agreement, presumably
under section 8(f), only regarding work on that specific site and
could not be compelled to cover his other seven jobs and the employees working on them with a union contract.
C. The Union's Purpose Must Be To Protect Its Members From
Working Alongside Nonunion Employees.
During its discussion of Congress' intent not to countenance the
use of subcontracting agreements in the construction industry as a
broad organizational weapon, but rather, to limit their use to a collective bargaining relationship at a single jobsite, the Court stated
the function that the 8(e) construction proviso was intended to fill.
"[T]he purpose of the section 8(e) proviso was to alleviate the frictions that may arise when union men work continuously alongside
nonunion men on the same construction site."45 The Court went on
to state that the agreement before it did not serve that purpose or
function, for it was not limited to jobsites on which Local 100's
members were working and it "applied only to the work Local 100's
members would perform themselves . . . leaving open a possibility
that they would be employed alongside nonunion subcontractors."' 6
Accordingly, and again in an effort to carry out the congressional
intent to limit the use of subcontracting agreements as an economic
weapon for "top down" organizing, the Court seemed to hold that
the above-quoted function of the 8(e) proviso must be met for such
an agreement to be sanctioned by the 8(e) proviso; that is, the union
seeking the agreement must be protecting its4 7 members from having
to work alongside nonunion employees.
To accomplish this purpose, a union may seek or be party to a
restrictive agreement only with regard to specific jobs where its
members will be working: its members have to be on the job to require the "protection". Thus, any agreement that generally restricts
the subcontracting of the work covered by the union's agreement to
only "union firms" would be invalid, for it would be possible that
a nonunion subcontractor and the contractor urged the union to sign a one-job contract with
the subcontractor).
45. 421 U.S. at 630 [quoting Drivers Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.3d 547, 553 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
46. Id. at 631.
47. The Court nowhere suggests that the union party to the restrictive subcontracting
agreement has any interest in protecting, and the purpose of the section 8(e) proviso is not met
by that union seeking to protect, members of other unions from being required to work alongside nonunion employees. In fact, the Court seems to limit the purpose of the section 8(e)

proviso to the protection of members of the union seeking the agreement. "The agreement
apparently was not designed to protect Local 10's members ......
Id. Therefore, the
union's object must be to protect its members, not union interests generally.

none of that union's members would be on a specific job site. Furthermore, any general agreement that required subcontracting of the
union's work only to subcontractors that were signatory to agreements with it would be invalid because the agreement would not
insure that other employees on the job site would be "union." Even
when the latter type agreement is coupled with a valid restriction on
the subcontracting of all other work only to "union firms," it violates
section 8(e), since that part of the agreement that requires the general
contractor to subcontract the agreeing union's work only to union

firms does not protect the agreeing union's members, but only the
members of other unions.

In addition, if an agreement or series of agreements required
that unit work be subcontracted only to companies meeting "union
standards," and that all other work be subcontracted only to "union
firms", the latter part of that agreement would violate 8(e), for the
unit employees represented by the union might not be working on
the job at all, and thus, would not require protection against working

with nonunion employees.
Moreover, because the proviso was intended to protect union
members from working alongside nonunion workers, the subcontracting agreement could lawfully restrict subcontracting to union
firms only at a time when the contractor's unionized employees were
actually working at the construction site.4 8
Finally, because the function of 8(e) is not to provide unions
with a broad organizational weapon, but is merely to protect union

employees from working alongside nonunion employees on the same
site, the Court seemed to intend that an otherwise lawful restrictive
subcontracting agreement could not limit subcontracting only to
firms who had an agreement with a specific union or unions.4 9
48. Connell Memorandum, supra note 9, at 297, 304, 311-12.
49. Passages throughout the Court's opinion (as well as the congressional objective of
limiting the use of subcontracting agreements as organizational weapons) support this view.
See 421 U.S. at 631-33. As part of its antitrust discussion, the Court noted that "[tihe agreements with general contractors did not simply prohibit subcontracting to any nonunionfirm;
they prohibited subcontracting to any firm that did not have a contract with Local 100." Id. at
624 (emphasis added). Also, the Court found inappropriate an agreement limiting subcontracting to a firm having a contract with Local 100. Furthermore, the Court's discussion of the
purpose of the proviso deals with the interests of union employees working next to other union
employees, and nowhere mentions any legitimate need to specify the union alongside whom
their members must work. Indeed, as the latter specificity would greatly enhance the use of the
subcontracting agreement as an organizational weapon, it would seem to be barred by section
8(e).
The Court suggested, moreover, that in enacting the section 8(e) proviso, Congress intended simply to preserve the status quo under Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v.
NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (1958). See 421 U.S. at 629 n.8. In Sand Door, the Court
was dealing with a restrictive clause providing that workmen shall not be required to handle
nonunion material, and a clause directed at an "unfair company." Although Sand Door did
not consider the validity of such a clause, and thus, presumably considered it legal for its
purposes, it clearly was dealing with a general "nonunion" clause, and not one specifying any
particular union. To the extent that the section 8(e) proviso was intended only to maintain the

Therefore, following the Connell decision it appears that a
union could negotiate a valid restrictive subcontracting agreement
only if it had a collective bargaining relationship with a general contractor, only if the agreement covered a specific job where its members were employed or were to be employed, and only if that
agreement provided that all work subcontracted by the general contractor to be performed on that construction site would be subcontracted only to "union firms."5 The NLRB, however, reads Connell
very differently.
IV.

The Labor Board Decisions

In Carpenters Locals 944 and 235, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters (Woelke & Romero Framing),5 1 the Board dealt with a
carpenter's union contract demand (the union had represented
Woelke's employees for years) that included the following restrictive
subcontracting proposals:
103.2 The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his
subcontractors on the jobsite will subcontract any work to be done
at the site of construction, alteration, painting or repair of a building, structure or other work (including quarries, rock, sand and
gravel plants, asphalt plants, ready-mix concrete plants, established on or adjacent to the jobsite to process or supply materials
for the convenience of the Contractor for jobsite use) except to a
person, firm or corporation, party to an appropriate current labor
agreement with the appropriate Union, or subordinate body signatory to this Agreement.
103.3.1 The Contractor and his subcontractors shall not subcontract any jobsite work, except to a contractor whose employees
on that job are members of a bona-fide labor organization, and
whose labor costs on such job, at all times during the term of his
subcontract hereunder, are not less than those of contractors perstatus quo under the Sand Door decision, only such general clauses are legitimate under the
proviso.
It might be argued that this construction of the Court's opinion in Connell is contrary to
the implicit holdings in cases such as Essex County & Vicinity Dist. Council of Carpenters v.
NLRB, 332 F.2d 636 (3d Cir. 1964), and Dallas Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 396
F.2d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1968). These cases upheld, as protected by the section 8(e) proviso, agreements providing that work done by other than members of the union seeking or signatory to
the agreement must be done only by firms signatory to clauses with specific unions. The
courts' opinions in those cases do not reveal, however, any argument that such clauses were
invalid because they were so limited to specific unions. See the Court's discussion of Los
Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 214 N.L.R.B. 562 (1974) in Connell Constr. Co. v.
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 631-32 n.10 (1975). Moreover, to the extent
that Connell is inconsistent with those earlier lower court opinions, they are, arguably, implicitly overruled on this point. Indeed, the Board's General Counsel takes the position that limiting subcontracting to employers with contracts with specific unions violates section 8(e).
Connell Memorandum, supra note 9, at 298.
50. The agreement may not specify any particular union or unions, such as "an AFLCIO Union," "a member of the Local AFL-CIO Trade Council," etc.
51. 99 L.R.R.M. 1580 (1978).

forming similar work to that covered by this Agreement, including, but not limited to, costs of subsistence, vacation, holiday,
medical, hospitalization, wages, premiums, dental, life insurance
and retirement benefits as provided by this Agreement. 52
Woelke refused to agree to these clauses and the union picketed him.
Woelke then filed unfair labor practice charges alleging that the
clauses violated section 8(e) and that the picketing to obtain agreement on them violated section 8(b)(4)(A).
The Board had no trouble finding that both clauses were "secondary" and thus violative of section 8(e) unless privileged by the
proviso. Clause 103.2 clearly was not a primary "union standards"
clause, but required that any subcontractor be "signatory" to a union
agreement. In addition, it required that all subcontractors be signatory to union contracts, not just subcontractors who were performing
work historically done by the represented carpenters. Clause 103.3.1
was also secondary for it did not merely require that the economic
equivalent of wages and fringes be paid, but further required that
each subcontractor be signatory to a union contract. 3
The Board than went on to determine whether these clauses
were privileged by the 8(e) construction proviso. On this issue the
General Counsel, citing Connell, argued that the clauses were not
privileged because they were not limited to only jobsites where
Woelke employed carpenters represented by the union, and because
they required that subcontractors have agreements with particular
unions. 54 The Board, reading Connell very narrowly, simply dismissed the General Counsel's arguments with the conclusion that the
Connell Court required nothing more than a collective bargaining
relationship between the union seeking a clause restricting the subcontracting of jobsite work and the contractor from whom it sought
such an agreement.5 5
In Colorado Building and Construction Trades Council,56 the
company, Utilities Services Engineering, had no collective bargaining relationship with any union. Nonetheless, the Colorado Building
and Construction Trades Council sent it a letter requesting that it
sign a restrictive subcontracting agreement to eliminate substandard
wages in the area. When the company failed to respond to the letter,
52. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1582.
53. Although the Board did not mention it, the clause also appears to be secondary because it requires "union standards" of all subcontractors, not just those performing what is
historically carpenters' work.
54. The parties conceded that a collective bargaining relationship existed between
Woelke and the Carpenters. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1581-82.
55. Indeed, the Board went even further and suggested that the clauses might have been
lawful even without a bargaining relationship if they were aimed at avoiding a Denver Building
Trades problem. See notes 36-42 and accompanying text supra. The Board expounded further on this in Colorado Constr. Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601, 1604 (1978). See notes 6163 and accompanying text infra.
56. 99 L.R.R.M. 1601 (1978).

the Council picketed it. The company filed an 8(b)(4)(A) charge,
and the issue was whether the requested agreement violated section
8(e). The agreement contained the following clauses:
This contract shall govern, and be limited to, labor performed
at the site of construction, alteration, painting, or repair of building, structure, or other work of the Contractor by sub-contractors,
and shall be limited to work which is not customarilyperformed by
employees of the Contractor. This agreement shall not apply to
work on any project for the performance of which the Contractor
has entered into a sub-contract on or before the date of execution
of this Agreement. Nor shall this Agreement apply to any work
performed by any employee or employees in a certified or recognized collective bargaining unit, or by any employee or employees
who have a representative for collective bargaining.
It shall be the obligation of the Contractor to include in every
sub-contract for work governed by this Agreement a provision requiring the payment of prevailing rates of wages for such work.
In the event any sub-contractor shall fail to pay its employees the
prevailing rates of wages for work within the scope of this Agreement, the Contractor shall make whole the employees of sub-conwhich they sustain by reason of
tractors for all losses and damages
57
the sub-contractor's default.
Again, the Board lost no time in concluding that the clauses
were secondary, for the clauses did not seek to protect the work of
unit employees, but rather, sought to protect only other employees.
Indeed, the Board noted that there was no contractual unit because
the union did not represent anyone.58 In addition, the first clause
specifically stated that the agreement applied only to work "not customarily performed by employees of the Contractor."
The Board then turned to the Connell issue. The General
Counsel argued that the clauses were not privileged by the 8(e) proviso because there was no collective bargaining relationship and because the agreement was not limited to times and places when the
contractor would have its employees working. The Union (Council)
argued that Connell should be limited only to situations in which the
union seeking such clauses is trying to organize subcontractors. The
Board rejected the union's argument and found a violation. 59 First,
the Board held, as it had in Woelke, that a collective bargaining relationship was normally required between a union and a construction
contractor before a restrictive subcontracting agreement would be
privileged by the 8(e) proviso.6' Since no relationship existed in this
case, the Board held that 8(e) would be violated by an agreement on
the clauses, except that they might be protected by the proviso if they
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1602 (empahsis added).
Id. at 1603.
Id.
Id. at 1604. See also notes 54-55 and accompanying text supra.

were aimed at avoiding a Denver Building Trades problem.6
The Board then described in general terms the Denver problem
by stating that some kind of restrictive clauses might be privileged,
even without a bargaining relationship, if they were "addressed to
problems posed by the common situs relationships on a particular
jobsite or to the reduction of friction between union and nonunion
employees at a jobsite."6 2 The clauses in question, however, did not
meet this standard. First, the clause neither restricted the subcontracting of nonunit work to union subcontractors nor applied only to
job sites where union members were working; the clause allowed the
possibility that union and nonunion employees would be working on
the same job. Second, the Union was not seeking to organize any
subcontractors, and indeed, no subcontracting was being done by the
contractor at the picketed job. Accordingly, said the Board, the
clauses could not have been aimed at avoiding problems arising
from the contractor-subcontractor relationship on the construction
site. Thus, as neither Denver problem was addressed by the clauses,
they were not protected by the 8(e) proviso.6 3
Los Angeles Building and Construction Trades Council' involved a demand and picketing by the Carpenters Union to obtain a
full collective bargaining agreement from a construction contractor
with whom it had no preexisting bargaining relationship but with
whom it could lawfully enter into a prehire agreement pursuant to
section 8(f) of the Act. The main issue in the case was whether a
union attempt to establish an 8(f) relationship was sufficient to meet
65
the Connell requirement of a "collective bargaining relationship."
66
sufficient.
was
this
that
The Board held, probably correctly,
Subsidiary issues involved the General Counsel's contentions
that the obviously secondary restrictive subcontracting clauses contained in the contract were not privileged because they were not limited to sites where union-represented employees would be working
and the clauses required that any subcontractor have an agreement
with specific unions ("affiliated with the Building and Construction
Trades Department, AFL-CIO . . ."). The Board, as it had in
Woelke, dismissed those arguments on the ground that Connell required no more than a bargaining relationship to privilege an 8(e)
construction site agreement between a union and an employer in the
construction industry. 67 The Board further held that picketing to ob61.
62.
privilege
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

99 L.R.R.M. at 1604.
The Board specifically declined to describe the type of clause that the proviso might
as dealing with the Denver problem. Id. at 1604.
Id.
99 L.R.R.M. 1593 (1978).
See notes 23-32 and accompanying text supra.
99 L.R.R.M. at 1598.
See note 55 and accompanying text supra.

tain an 8(f) agreement was controlled by section 8(b)(7) of the Act,68
which, in the case of unrepresented employees, allows such picketing
to continue for a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days.6 9 Yet, the the Board did find the restrictive subcontracting
clauses to be invalid under section 8(e), not because of any failure to
meet Connell requirements, but because the clauses allowed the
union to enforce them by strike or picketing.7"
Finally, the International Union of Operating Engineers Local
707 1 decision of the Board dealt with a signatory, and thus secondary, subcontracting clause in an agreement that allowed the union
to strike or picket to enforce the clause. The Board found that the
clause met the Connell standards for the same reasons expressed in
Woelke, but that the clause violated 8(e) because of the "self help"
72
(strike and picketing) enforcement provisions that applied to it.
In summary, the Board has read Connell very narrowly. Instead
of concluding that a restrictive subcontracting agreement must relate
to a particular jobsite and protect union employees from working
beside nonunion employees, as well as arise from a bargaining or
8(f) relationship, the Board has held that those first two standards
are means alternative to the bargaining relationship by which a subcontracting clause may become privileged under the 8(e) proviso. In
so interpreting Connell, the Board has also rejected any contention
that 8(e) is violated by a clause restricting subcontracting only to
firms having agreements with a specific unions.
Assuming for the moment that the Board's analysis is correct, a
question arises concerning under what kind of clause and under
what circumstances will a union and an employer be privileged to
negotiate. If the union has a bargaining relationship or is seeking a
valid 8(f) agreement,73 then the clause may restrict subcontracting to
subcontractors either meeting union standards or having specific
union contracts, provided the clause is not enforceable by strikes or
68. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1599.
69. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(c) (1976).
70. See notes 17-18 and accompanying text supra. The subcontracting clauses themselves contained no specific enforcement provisions, but the agreement's provisions for settling
grievances and disputes provided,
Nothing contained in the Agreement, or any part thereof, shall affect or apply to
the Union in any action it may take against any Contractor or subcontractor who has
failed, neglected or refused to comply with or execute any settlement or decision
reached at any step of the grievance procedure or through Arbitration under the
terms of Article V hereof.
99 L.R.R.M. at 1599 (emphasis added).
71. 99 L.R.R.M. 1589 (1978).
72. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1591-92.
73. An industrial employer acting as its own general contractor may not enter into a
valid § 8(f) agreement, for he is not engaged "primarily" in construction as required by § 8(0.
See note 32 supra.

picketing. Thus, either of the following would seem to be privileged
by the Board's decisions:
The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on the jobsite will subcontract any work to be done at the
site of construction, except to a firm party to an agreement with a
union affiliated with the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO. Failure to comply with this clause shall entitle the Union to judicial relief only.
The Contractor agrees that neither he nor any of his subcontractors on the jobsite will subcontract any work to be done at the
site of construction, except to a firm whose labor costs are not less
than those of contractors performing work under contracts with a
union affiliated with the Building and Construction Trades Department, AFL-CIO. Failure to comply with this clause shall entitle the Union to judicial relief only.
Nevertheless, if the union does not have a bargaining relationship and is not seeking a valid 8(f) agreement, then it will be risky,
even under the Board's analysis of Connell, to negotiate any subcontracting restrictions.7 4 For the daring, however, it may be possible in
these circumstances to negotiate a union signatory clause covering
all work at the construction site; but it would seem that the clause
must be limited to one specific jobsite,, members of the negotiating
union must be working on that job, and the clause must require that
even subcontracted unit work go only to union signatory firms."
Thus, the following clause may be valid:
The Contractor agrees that if members of this Union are
working on this specific job he shall not subcontract any work to
be done on the site of construction of this single specific job to any
firm that is not a party to an agreement with a union affiliated
with the Building and Construction Trades Department of the
AFL-CIO, provided that the firm to which work is subcontracted
shall meet the requirements of this clause if it enters into an agreement with an affiliated Union that is limited to this specific job.
Failure to comply with this clause shall entitle the Union to judicial relief only.
V.

Is It Wise To Rely Upon The Board?

The Board's analysis of Connell will not be the final word. Reviewing courts will scrutinize the Board's decisions. Even more
troublesome is the fact that antitrust litigation, like Connell itself,
will proceed against employers and unions-and the result of an un74. Even an otherwise valid "union standards" clause would appear to be secondary
because the union represents no "unit" whose work is intended to be preserved. See Colorado
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601, 1603 (1978).
75. Under the Board's analysis of Connell, it would appear that such a clause would
more likely be valid if there is a specific nonunion contractor, working on the specific job in
question, that the union is attempting to organize. Although that factor seems to be directly
counter to the Connell Court's concern about "top down" organizing, it is apprarently a
favorable consideration for legality as the Board views it. See Colorado Bldg. & Constr.
Trades Council, 99 L.R.R.M. 1601, 1603-04 (1978).

privileged clause in the eyes of the FTC7 6 and courts may be treble
damage awards against unions and contractors. Thus, the question
whether one shall rely upon these recent Board decisions and negotiate accordingly necessarily arises. In the author's judgment, one
should not rely upon these decisions since one cannot be sure that
the Board is correct.
This uncertainty is based upon several considerations. First, it
is most natural for the Board to read Connell very narrowly, not because of any pro-union bias, but because its experience with labor
relations over the years lead it to the pre-Connell conclusion that
clauses such as the one involved in Connell simply did not violate
section 8(e). 77 The Supreme Court disagreed, as it may well disagree
with the new narrow reading of Connell adopted by the Board.
Second, the General Counsel of the NLRB disagrees with the
Board's narrow reading of Connell8 and at least one respected lawyer on the union's side believes Connell raises the question whether
subcontracting clauses must be limited to a particular jobsite.7 9
Third, even the Federal Trade Commission endorses the concept that even a restrictive agreement negotiated within a collective
bargaining relationship may be enforced only when union members
are actually working on the job site,8 ° a requirement that some of the
most expansive readers of Connell doubt the Court ever intended."'
Fourth, a number of courts interpret Connell to mean that even
agreements arrived at within a bargaining relationship must also
meet additional requirements to be protected by the 8(e) proviso.
Thus, the agreement must be limited to a particular jobsite8 2 and
must seek to eliminate friction between union and nonunion employees by applying only to sites on which the union's members are
working.8 3
Last, the Board's reading of Connell does not appear to meet the
Supreme Court's voiced concerns. Thus, for example, to privilege
76. See the report of the Federal Trade Commission consent agreement involving the
Alaska Teamsters in 138 DAILY LABOR REPORT A-I (BNA, July 18, 1978).
77. See, e.g., Los Angeles Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 214 N.L.R.B. 562 (1974);
Plumbers Local 100 (Hagler Construction Co.), NLRB Case No. 16-CC-447 (May I, 1974).
The Supreme Court cited both of these cases in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616-32 n.10 (1975).
78. Connell Memorandum, supra note 9, at 296.
79.

See 132 DAILY LABOR REPORT A-I (BNA, July 9, 1975) (report of comments by

George Kaufman to the Labor Relations Committee of the Federal Bar Association).
80. See note 76 supra.
81. See Hotvedt & Sisco, FTC Move on Alaska Teamsters Marks First Step in Labor
Field, Legal Times of Wash., Sept. 4, 1978, at 10, 12.
82. Operating Eng'rs Local 370 v. Neilsen & Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 2861 (1975).
83. See NLRB v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs Local 542, 532 F.2d 902, 90607 (3d Cir. 1976); Long v. Floorcraft Carpet Co., 95 L.R.R.M. 3143, 3144 (1977); Waggoner v.
R. McGray, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 580, 583 (C.D. Cal. 1977); Operating Eng'rs Local 370 v. Neilsen & Co., 92 L.R.R.M. 2861, 2863-64 (D. Idaho 1975).

any restrictive subcontracting agreement merely because it is negotiated in the context of a bargaining relationship would allow massive
"top down" organizing, for every subcontractor working on every
job of every contractor bound by the agreement would be required
to sign a union agreement covering everyone of the subcontractor's
jobs. Then, if the Board is correct and subcontracting agreements
may be privileged even without a bargaining relationship if they are
directed at protecting unionized labor from working alongside nonunion labor, the union representing the subcontractor's employees
could seek a subcontracting agreement from every general contractor
on the jobs where the subs are working requiring that all onsite work
on those jobs be done only by union contractors or subs.
To illustrate, assume the Laborers Union has a bargaining relationship with contractor A and obtains an agreement restricting subcontracting only to firms with AFL-CIO contracts. Assume A is
performing seven jobs and employs five different subs on each job.
Those thirty-five subcontractors will all have to sign AFL-CIO contracts that will cover not only their work for A but for any other
contractor as well. Assume each of those thirty-five subcontractors is
working on two other jobs. The union with whom each has an
agreement can then go to the general contractor on each of those
seventy other jobs and seek an agreement restricting subcontracting
of all work on those jobs to only AFL-CIO firms in order to protect
their members for having to work beside nonunion members. If
each of those seventy jobs employed but two subcontractors each,
210 more firms (including the general contractors) would be unionized, at least for those jobs. In theory, then, one restrictive agreement negotiated under the Board's reading of Connell could result in
the unwilling unionization of 315 units of employees, all by AFLCIO unions. Although it is extremely unlikely that such a result
would ever apply as a practical matter, the example does serve to
illustrate the "top down" organizing potential encompassed by the
Board's reading of Connell.
On the other hand, a broader reading of Connell, consistent
with that suggested earlier in this discussion, is illustrated by the following example. Again, assume the Laborers Union has a bargaining relationship with contractor A and obtains an agreement
restricting subcontracting on one particular job where union laborers
are working to subs who have union contracts on that job only.
Again, assume seven subcontractors are hired. Union laborers will
not have to work next to nonunion workers, but only one job each
for seven subcontractors will be union-organized and even then the
employees of these subcontractors might have some choice regarding
which union they want to represent them.

In sum, the major goal of the Supreme Court in Connell was to
uphold Congress' desire to limit "top down" organizing in the construction industry. The Board's reading of Connell does little if anything to uphold that policy. As a result, the Board's recent decisions
may not stand the test of time.
VI.

Conclusion

The remaining issue is what should construction unions and
employers do now? It seems clear that construction contractors and
unions may agree upon the following clause:
The Employer agrees that he shall not subcontract any work to be
done on the site of construction of this single specific job (whether
or not that work comes within the territorial and occupational jurisdiction of the union), but only if such work is to be performed
contemporaneously with the work of the unit of the Employer's
employees, 84 to any employer, company or concern that is not a
party to a collective bargaining agreement with a union (meaning
any organization or group meeting the definition of a "labor organization" under § 2(5) of the NLRA), provided, however, that
such employer, company or concern to which such work is to be
subcontracted shall meet the above requirements if it enters into a
collective bargaining agreement with any union limited only to its
work and the work of its employees on this single specific job and
provided further, that this agreement shall supersede and replace,
for the duration of this specific job and only in relation to the
work to be done at the site of construction of this specific job, any
and all other subcontracting restrictions (including restrictions
limiting subcontracting to employers, companies and concerns
who provide equivalent economic employment conditions) contained in all collective bargaining agreements between the Employer and any Union, and if any such subcontracting restriction
may not be so superseded and replaced then the subcontracting
restriction set forth in this paragraph shall be null and void. Failure to comply with this clause shall entitle the union to seek judicial relief only.85
But suppose the bargaining union wants a more restrictive
clause in line with those recently approved by the NLRB, and strikes
to obtain the clause. At that point the contractor is caught between a
rock and a hard place. No injunctive relief against the strike is available under section 10(1) of the Act via the filing of an 8(b)(4)(A)
87
charge,8 6 for the Board would find no 8(b)(4)(A) violation. Similarly, although the Supreme Court left open the question in Con84. There is a real question whether the phrase limiting the applicability of subcontracting restrictions to times when the contractor's union employees are working is necessary. See
note 81 supra. The Federal Trade Commission apparently deems such a phase necessary to
avoid antitrust liability. See note 76 supra.
85. For this clause to be valid, the union and the employers must have a collective bargaining or a § 8(f) relationship and the employer must be employing or intending to employ
the union's members on the site of the specific job in question. See also note 32 supra.
86. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1976).
87. See notes 51-55 and accompanying text supra.

nell,88 it would appear that the Norris-LaGuardia Act forecloses
injunctive relief against union picketing to obtain such a clause.8 9
Thus, the contractor who cannot stand a prolonged strike is left
with the alternative of agreeing to a clause that may subject him to
treble antitrust damages. In such a case, the contractor may simply
refuse to abide by the clause and leave himself open to possible damage actions by unions representing employees who would have
worked had the subcontracting been done in accordance with the
clause. The preferable course, however, would seem to. be the one
taken by Connell-agree to the clause under protest and commence
a court action under the antitrust laws to declare the clause invalid.
Although such an action will not necessarily shield the contractor
from antitrust suits if he abides by the subcontracting clause in the
interim, if the suit includes a request to enjoin the implementation of
the clause and a preliminary injunction can be obtained, the contractor should be effectively protected. 9°
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